Product Safety: Liability, R & D and Signaling
构建了一个垄断模型，研究企业在产品安全研发投入不可观察时，如何通过定价向消费者传递安全信号，并分析不同责任制度对研发投资和价格-安全关系的影响。
The authors develop a monopoly model of product design and safety signaling incorporating a parametric liability specification. The firm first engages in R&D to affect the safety of its product. Since the outcome of R&D trials is unobservable to consumers, the firm then chooses its price, understanding that consumers may draw inferences from the price about the product's safety. Consumers acquire and use the product; injuries lead to losses which are allocated by the liability system. The authors vary the liability system's allocation of losses and trace out the implications for R&D investment and the price-safety relationship. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.