The Dynamics of Monopoly Union Wages with Asymmetric Information
将垄断工会模型扩展到两期，假设企业比工人更了解资本规模，企业第一期的行动会传递影响第二期工资的信息，导致第一期劳动需求下降。
J. T. Dunlop's (1944) work on the monopoly union model emphasizes that the primary role of wages is to distribute industry rents. This paper extends the model to two periods and it is, furthermore, assumed that firms are better informed than workers about the size or quality of capital. This variable is unchanged over time so the firm's first period action signals information relevant for the second period wage. This dynamic relationship tends to lower labor demand in the first period. Copyright 1995 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.