Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve
研究委员会决策透明度对成员提出异议意愿的影响，利用美联储1993年公开会议记录这一自然实验，发现公开记录确实改变了异议激励。
Transparency in committee decision making may have clear benefits by making members more accountable to outside observers. We consider one potential cost: the possibility that publishing records of deliberations will make members more reluctant to offer dissenting opinions. We construct a model that compares incentives for members with 'career concerns' to voice dissent when deliberations occur in public or in private. We test the model using an original dataset based on deliberations of the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee, asking whether the FOMC's 1993 decision to begin releasing transcripts of its meetings has altered incentives for dissent. We find evidence that this is indeed the case. Copyright © 2008 The Author(s).