Standard Auctions with Identity-Dependent Externalities
分析三个竞拍者的公开增价拍卖中，身份依赖外部性如何影响均衡出价行为，发现外部性足够大时公开拍卖比密封拍卖带来更高预期收益和效率。
We analyze equilibrium bidding behavior in a three bidder open ascending bid auction with identity dependent externalities. We prove the existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium and then show that for sufficiently large externalities, the open auction yields strictly higher expected revenues compared to a sealed bid auction. An open auction reveals to bidders more payoff relevant information than a sealed bid auction and as a consequence, bidders are shown to have a higher willingness to pay in the early rounds of an open auction. The open auction is also shown to be more efficient than the sealed bid auction.