Location of Decision Rights Within Multinational Firms
利用美国跨国公司二十多年的数据，研究了决策权配置地点与公司环境是否匹配，发现错配会损害企业绩效，且绩效越差的子公司越可能被调整决策权。
ABSTRACT Using U.S.‐based multinational firm data gathered over more than two decades, we examine factors associated with the location of decision rights within these firms, whether the inappropriate assignment of decision rights is associated with poor firm performance, and whether these firms relocate decision rights in response to their evolving environments. We find that a mismatch between the location of decision rights and a firm's environment is associated with weak firm performance. We also show that the likelihood a parent company will alter the assignment of decision rights to a subsidiary is increasing in the extent of a mismatch although this likelihood is decreasing in the strength of the subsidiary's performance.