Unitary Thrifts: A Performance Analysis
比较了由非存款机构拥有的单一储蓄控股公司旗下的储蓄机构与其他储蓄机构的绩效，发现前者表现更好且风险更低，因其收入、资产和资金来源更多元化。
Title IV of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 closed the unitary thrift holding company loophole, which allowed a limited commingling of banking and commerce. This article examines whether eliminating this loophole was beneficial by empirically comparing the performance of thrifts in holding companies owned by nondepository institutions (UTHC thrifts) with other thrifts. Important differences between these two types of thrifts are found. UTHC thrifts tend to outperform the others during the period studied and appear to be less risky-possibly because UTHC thrifts seem to have more diversified revenue streams, loan and asset portfolios, and funding sources than do other thrifts. No evidence is found to suggest that limited commingling of banking and commerce, in the form of the UTHC loophole, poses undue risks to the federal financial safety net.