Unraveling in Matching Markets
用两期匹配模型分析早期签约（提前签约）的激励，发现它提供保险但导致低效匹配，并探讨了禁止早期签约对不同类型参与者的影响。
The authors use a two-period matching model with initial uncertainty about productivities of participants to analyze incentives for early contracting or unraveling. Unraveling provides insurance in the absence of complete markets but causes inefficient assignments. Unraveling is more likely the smaller the applicant pool, the smaller the proportion of more-promising applicants, and the greater the heterogeneity in the pool. Banning early contracts hurts firms and benefits less-promising applicants; the effects on more-promising applicants depend on how the gains from early contracts are shared. Ex post buyouts eliminate inefficient assignments and more-promising applicants always unravel. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.