Competing Premarital Investments
研究婚前投资在婚姻市场中的竞争效应，发现大型市场中竞争均衡有效，小型市场中投资激励提高但可预测性降低。
Pre-marital investments by spouses are largely viewed as public goods within the marriage. So individuals may underinvest. But individuals also use their investments to compete for spouses with higher investments. In a large marriage market, the higher equilibrium match quality obtained by increasing pre-marital investment exactly internalizes the external benefit of the investment so the competitive equilibrium is efficient. This model of competing investments in local public goods is a special case of Rosen’s hedonic market model. In small marriage markets, the competition for spouses will raise incentives to invest in pre-marital investments as well as making these investments less predictable. 1