Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
研究了代理人技能为私人信息时，面对一系列任务如何设计最优动态契约，发现随着贴现因子和时间跨度增加，代理人每期效用趋近于技能公开时的水平。
We study a novel dynamic principal-agent setting with moral hazard and adverse selection (persistent as well as repeated). In the model, an agent whose skills are his private information faces a finite sequence of tasks, one after the other. Upon arrival of each task, the agent learns its level of difficulty and then chooses whether to accept or refuse each task in turn and how much effort to exert. Although his decision to accept or refuse a task is publicly known, the agent's effort level is his private information. We characterize optimal contracts and show that the per-period utility of the agent approaches his per-period utility when his skills are publicly known, as the discount factor and the time horizon increase. © The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Review of Economic Studies Limited.