Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale
研究对称独立私人价值拍卖中引入转售后投机者的作用，发现第二价格和英式拍卖存在多个低效均衡，投机者可获利；第一价格和荷兰拍卖则基本唯一均衡，投机者能否获利取决于竞拍人数、价值分布和折现因子。
In standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale creates a role for a speculator—a bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale. For second-price and English auctions the efficient value-bidding equilibrium coexists with a continuum of inefficient equilibria in which the speculator wins the auction and makes positive profits. First-price and Dutch auctions have an essentially unique equilibrium, and whether or not the speculator wins the auction and distorts the final allocation depends on the number of bidders, the value distribution, and the discount factor. Speculators do not make profits in first-price or Dutch auctions.