Transparency and Deliberation Within the FOMC: A Computational Linguistics Approach*
利用1993年联邦公开市场委员会的自然实验和计算语言学算法，研究了透明度对货币政策制定者审议的影响，发现透明度既带来纪律效应也带来从众效应，且纪律效应占主导。
How does transparency, a key feature of central bank design, affect monetary policy makers’ deliberations? Theory predicts a positive discipline effect and negative conformity effect. We empirically explore these effects using a natural experiment in the Federal Open Market Committee in 1993 and computational linguistics algorithms. We first find large changes in communication patterns after transparency. We then propose a difference-in-differences approach inspired by the career concerns literature, and find evidence for both effects. Finally, we construct an influence measure that suggests the discipline effect dominates.