EXIT OPTIONS AND DIVIDEND POLICY UNDER LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS
研究企业在面临流动性约束时，如何权衡持有现金的预防性动机与流动性成本，并刻画最优退出与股利支付政策，发现金融摩擦既导致低效退出，也通过均衡价格间接造成低效存续。
We introduce a post‐entry liquidity constraint to the standard model of a firm with serially correlated profitability and an irreversible exit decision. We assume that firms with no cash holdings and negative cash flow must either exit or raise new cash at a transaction cost. This creates a precautionary motive for holding cash, which must be traded off against the liquidity cost of holding cash. We characterize the optimal exit and payout policy. The direct effect of financial frictions is to impose inefficient exit, but there is also an indirect effect through higher equilibrium price that leads to inefficient survival.