Asymmetric Information about Migrant Earnings and Remittance Flows
利用印度丈夫在卡塔尔工作的家庭数据，发现妻子普遍少报丈夫收入，且少报程度与汇款金额负相关；构建了包含信息不对称和成本验证的汇款交换模型，其预测与实证结果高度吻合。
We examine asymmetric information about migrant earnings and its implications for remittance behavior using a sample of Indian households with husbands working overseas in Qatar. On average, wives underreport their husbands’ income and underreporting is more prevalent in households with higher earning migrants. The discrepancy in earning reports is strongly correlated with variation in remittances: greater underreporting by wives is associated with lower remittances. We develop an exchange model of remittances with asymmetric information and costly state verification. The optimal remittance contract prescribes a threshold for remittances that invites verification only if unmet. The model's predictions closely match our empirical findings.