Systematic and Random Search A Synthesis
构建并检验了一个理论模型，将劳动力市场中的系统搜索与随机搜索统一起来，发现知识储备少、贴现率高或失业保险覆盖低的求职者更可能采用随机搜索。
This paper synthesizes two models of search in the labor market: systematic and random. We construct and test a theoretical model in which the searcher is endowed with information on some (possibly zero or all) individual firms in the labor market, as well as the overall wage offer distribution. We test the model using a special wave of the 1976 Current Population Survey. The major theoretical results of our model are as follows: searchers with lower stocks of knowledge (about individual firms), higher discount rates, or having lower coverage by unemployment insurance are more likely to engage in random search activities.