Optimal Forestry Contracts under Asymmetry of Information
研究了当采伐企业拥有采伐成本私人信息时，林业中的最优特许权合同，分析了成本是否随时间相关两种情况下的最优合同特征，并比较了线性合同与非线性合同带来的福利损失。
Abstract In this paper, I analyze optimal royalty contracts in forestry when the harvesting firm has private information on the cost of harvesting. This infinite horizon forest rotation model with asymmetry of information on the cost parameter results in a dynamic incentive problem. Depending on whether the costs are correlated over time or not, the firm either receives rent or receives no rent, associated with the continuation part of the rotation choice. I characterize the optimal contract explicitly in both cases. I also examine the loss in expected welfare surplus resulting from the use of a linear contract instead of the more general non‐linear contract.