The New Approach to Foreign Fisheries Allocation: An Economic Appraisal
评估美国如何利用收费等市场机制向外国分配渔业资源，分析竞争性分配系统如何为美国获取经济收益，并探讨远洋渔业国的买方垄断权力对租金捕获的限制。
This article addresses how the United States could most effectively use fees and other market mechanisms in allocating fisheries resources among foreign nations. Such an examination of market-oriented allocation is made timely by an evident shift in U.S. fisheries policy away from recognition of historic foreign fishing rights and toward the exchange of fishery resources for economic or other benefits to the United States. However novel such an idea may be in fisheries, it is a common approach to allocating other natural resources among foreign and domestic producers. Hence, an already existent economic literature analyzes many of the questions faced by those contemplating a similarly exchanged-based allocation policy for fisheries. Sections II and III describe current U.S. policy toward allocation of surplus fisheries resources, and some of the factors that determine the value of those surpluses to distant-water fishing nations. Sections IV and V then indicate in general how the U.S. might use competitive allocation systems to extract a portion of that value in the form of revenue or support for other economic, social, and political objectives; relates specific allocation measures to the efficiency of distant water fishing operations, and indicates how the monopsony power of some distant-water nations' fishing may constrain U.S. efforts to capture economic rent.