Bidder Behavior in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from Swedish Treasury Auctions
利用瑞典国债拍卖中竞标者的实际需求数据，发现竞标者会根据不确定性调整报价和数量，并验证了赢家诅咒驱动的投标削减模型。
We analyze a unique data set on multiunit auctions, which contains the actual demand schedules of the bidders as well as the auctionawards in over 400 Swedish Treasury auctions. First, we document that bidders vary their prices, bid dispersion, and the quantity demanded in response to increased uncertainty at the time of bidding. Second,we find that bid shading can be explained by a winner 19s curse 13driven model in which each bidder submits only one bid, despite the fact that the bidders in our data set use much richer bidding strategies.