An Experimental Test Of The Public Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis
通过实验检验了政府通过一次性税收资助公共物品是否会完全挤出自愿贡献，发现挤出不完全，且被征税者合作性显著提高，支持了人们从贡献公共物品中获得私人收益的替代模型。
This paper presents an experimental test of the proposition that government contributions to public goods, funded by lump-sum taxation, will completely crowd out voluntary contributions. It is found that crowding-out is incomplete and that subjects who are taxed are significantly more cooperative. This is true even though the tax does not affect the Nash equilibrium prediction. This result is taken as evidence for alternative models that assume people experience some private benefit from contributing to public goods. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.