The Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in
研究上游垄断厂商在中间品市场实行三级价格歧视的福利效应，发现歧视可能提高或降低福利，取决于是否阻止了社会无效率的后向整合。
The author examines third-degree price discrimination by an upstream monopolist in an intermediate good market. Discrimination is motivated by the fact that downstream firms differ in their abilities to integrate backward into supply of the input. The author shows that under reasonable specifications of equilibrium, price discrimination leads to all buyers facing higher input prices. In other cases, discrimination raises some prices and lowers others. The author derives conditions under which discrimination lowers welfare by reducing total output and shows that in some markets discrimination will raise welfare by preventing socially inefficient backward integration. Copyright 1987 by American Economic Association.