社团主义、货币政策与宏观经济表现:一个简单的博弈论分析

Corporatism, Monetary Policy and Macroeconomic Performance: A Simple Game Theoretic Analysis

Scandinavian Journal of Economics · 1995
被引 72
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

通过政府与工会的博弈模型,分析社团主义对通胀和产出的影响,发现工会的社团主义态度在非合作博弈中有益于经济表现,但效果取决于政府偏好;政府主导时某些社团主义可能引发通胀,合作博弈降低通胀但对产出影响不确定。

Abstract

The effects of corporatism on inflation and output are analyzed in a model of a game between a government and a union. This model allows consideration of aspects of corporatism other than centralization of wage bargaining and permits monetary policy to be endogenized. Corporatist attitudes on the part of the union have beneficial effects on economic performance, provided the game is played noncooperatively with simultaneous moves, through the nature of their impact depends critically on the government's preferences. If the government leads, certain forms of corporatism can be inflationary. Cooperative play reduces inflation but has an ambiguous effect on output. Copyright 1995 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.

法团主义货币政策宏观经济绩效博弈论