Interest rates in backward agriculture: the role of economic and extra-economic control
基于印度农村调查数据，分析放贷人如何通过经济和非经济手段控制贫困借款人，以获取高利息和抵押品收益，并解释利率差异的原因。
This paper examines the nature and roles of personalized control exercised by the rural moneylender over a class of poor borrowers to extract as much as possible in the form of high interest charges and income from undervalued and/or forfeited collaterals. Based on primary survey data from rural India, it analyzes the strategies adopted by the lender, through economic and extra-economic instruments, to enforce the credit contracts to accomplish his goals. It also provides a vivid picture of the variations in the level of interest rates and the reasons for it across a class of borrowers in the sample. Copyright 1990 by Oxford University Press.