Hidden Investment Cycles in Socialist Economies
建模了苏联等社会主义经济中一种特殊的投资周期，其开工和承诺占GDP的比例波动，而投资和净进口比例不变，这种周期是缓解紧张与稳定这两个冲突目标之间的折中。
A special type of the investment cycles that occur in certain socialist economies, e.g., the Soviet Union, is modeled. The ratios of starts and commitments to the GDP fluctuate, while those of investment and net imports are constant. Since starts and commitments are seldom observed, these fluctuations are assigned the attribute hidden. The main results are as follows: (1) hidden investment cycles are compromises between two conflicting goals: reducing tension and stabilization; and (2) existence of cost overrun is neither necessary nor sufficient for the emergence of cycles. Copyright 1989 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.