Competing for Attention: Is the Showiest Also the Best?
研究了在质量不同的备选方案通过选择自身显著性来竞争有限注意力时，竞争力量何时能确保高显著性对应高质量，使最常被选的方案成为最佳。
There are many situations in which alternatives ranked by quality wish to be chosen and compete for the imperfect attention of a chooser by selecting their own salience. The chooser may be "tricked" into choosing more salient but inferior alternatives. We investigate when competitive forces ensure instead that (strictly) higher salience is diagnostic of (strictly) higher quality, and the most frequently chosen alternative is the best one. We prove that the structure of externalities in the technology of salience is key. Broadly speaking, positive externalities in salience favour correlation between quality and salience.