Competition and Unanimity Revisited, Again
比较了DeAngelo和Makowski关于股东一致性的不同条件，论证了Makowski提出的“企业相对于市场较小”的条件并非不合理，而是对DeAngelo一般命题的有趣补充。
Conditions necessary and sufficient for shareholders to express unanimity with respect to firm decisions have been recently developed by Harry DeAngelo (1981). In a model economy where firms are properly relative to the market, Louis Makowski (1983) has subsequently found DeAngelo's requirement that existing securities span the opportunity set to be unnecessary for unanimity. At issue in this difference is what is meant by necessity in propositions relating to model economies: is Makowski's small relative to the market condition of interest, or is it, like the Giffen good, only a curiousity? While Makowski's case initially appears implausible, I shall here argue that the specification of an economy with markets is a reasonable instance of his analysis and qualifies as an interesting complement to the general propositions of DeAngelo.' In Section I some basic notation and the structure of the model economy are set out. Following that, the distinction between the unanimity proofs of DeAngelo and Makowski is drawn and the issue of reasonableness in necessary conditions is addressed. Conditions under which equivalently complete markets arise are then described, and the reasonableness of these are considered along with their implications for unanimity.