Equilibrium in auctions with entry
研究风险中性竞拍者进入拍卖的激励，发现过多潜在竞拍者会提高协调成本、损害福利，并证明减少市场厚度（即买家相对过剩）的政策对卖方和社会有益。
The authors model entry incentives in auctions with risk-neutral bidders and characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which the number of entrants is stochastic. The presence of too many potential bidders raises coordination costs that detract from welfare. The authors show that the seller and society can benefit from policies that reduce market thickness (i.e., the relative abundance of buyers). Their analysis extends well-known revenue-equivalence and ranking theorems but also demonstrates that variations in the auction environment affect optimal policies (e.g., reservation prices) in ways not anticipated by models that ignore entry. Copyright 1994 by American Economic Association.