Dominance and Competitive Bundling
研究两家不对称多产品企业之间的捆绑策略如何影响竞争，发现不同支配程度下捆绑对利润和市场份额的不同作用，并识别捆绑作为可信排挤策略的条件。
We study how bundling affects competition between two asymmetric multi-product firms. One firm dominates the other in that it produces better products more efficiently. For low (high) levels of dominance, bundling intensifies (relaxes) price competition and lowers (raises) both firms’ profits. For intermediate dominance levels, bundling increases the dominant firm’s market share substantially, thereby raising its profit while reducing its rival’s profit. Hence, the threat to bundle is then a credible foreclosure strategy. We also identify circumstances in which a firm that dominates only in some markets can profitably leverage its dominance to other markets by tying all its products.