Local versus Central Wage Bargaining with Endogenous Investments
研究了投资行为如何受工资谈判层级（中央或地方）影响，发现地方谈判下工资更低、利润更高，且合理假设下就业也更高。
Investment behavior may depend on whether wage bargaining takes place centrally or locally (at the firm level). The outcome of the wage bargain will in turn depend on previous investments. Ignoring other differences between the two bargaining regimes, endogenous investments imply that wages are lower and profits higher under local wage bargaining than under central bargaining. This does not necessarily imply that employment is highest under local bargaining, since investments may differ in the two cases. With a Nash bargaining solution, however, reasonable assumptions imply that employment is highest under local wage bargaining. Copyright 1990 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.