Corporate Payout Policy, Cash Savings, and the Cost of Consistency: Evidence from a Structural Estimation
通过动态结构模型，研究发现公司过度平滑 payout 导致现金持有波动大且现金过剩，而管理者对 payout 一致性的偏好解释了这一现象。
We develop a dynamic structural model to better understand how corporate payout policy is determined in conjunction with other corporate decisions. In a first‐best model, a manager maximizes equity value by choosing the firm's optimal financing, investment, dividends, and cash holdings. By using simulated method of moments, we show that, on average, firms excessively smooth their payout while making corporate savings overly volatile and retaining excess cash. We then extend the model to capture the effect of a manager, who perceives a cost to cutting payouts. Estimating the model, we infer the magnitude of this cost. We find that a managerial preference for consistent payout explains the smooth payout and high volatility of cash holdings.