Directors' Dealing and Post‐IPO Performance
研究董事在IPO后的股票交易行为与公司长期回报的关系，发现董事净卖出时公司后续表现更好，而净买入时表现较差，对投资者和监管者有参考价值。
Abstract We use a unique mainly hand‐collected dataset to assess the impact of directors' trades on IPOs' long‐term returns. We find that IPOs where directors are net sellers are more likely to generate positive long‐run returns which occur mostly before the sell trades, suggesting that directors sell when their IPOs reach their optimal values. Conversely, IPOs where directors are net buyers underperform significantly. Our results are not consistent with insider trading in seasoned firms, partly because the valuation uncertainty of IPOs and the specific motivations to trade weaken the precision of the trades' informativeness.