Do Firms Use Time-Vested Stock-Based Pay to Keep Research and Development Investments Secret?
研究发现，在依赖保密来从研发中获利的行业，研发密集型企业的高管持有更多未归属股权，且这种关系在高管利用研发信息能力更强时更显著，未归属股权还降低了高管离职率，表明企业通过基于时间的股权薪酬减少研发信息通过员工流动泄露给竞争对手。
I find that executives’ unvested equity holdings are larger when executives are employed by R&D‐intensive firms in industries that rely more on secrecy to profit from R&D. Moreover, I find that this relation is more pronounced for executives with a greater ability to exploit R&D‐related information and also holds for nonexecutive employees. In addition, I find that these firms use option grants with longer vesting periods and that unvested equity holdings reduce the likelihood that their executives leave to find employment elsewhere. Overall, my findings are consistent with firms using time‐vested stock‐based pay to reduce the leakage of R&D‐related information to competitors through employee mobility.