Property Transfers and Environmental Pollution: Incentive Effects of Alternative Policies
研究了未来清理责任转移如何影响当前所有者减少污染的激励，发现责任转移可能反而增加卖方投资污染治理的动力，且连带责任下的激励至少不低于无连带责任时。
This paper considers how transferring some or all future responsibility for cleanup of a contaminated site affects the current owner's incentives to reduce contamination, given that he anticipates selling his property in the future. The results depend on the probabilities that the parties will be judgment-proof, the distribution of surplus, and whether there is joint and several liability. Contrary to popular belief, we show that transferring liability can actually increase the seller's incentive to invest in pollution abatement. Furthermore, abatement incentives are at least as great and generally greater with joint and several liability than without it.