On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings
将生物学中的亲缘选择理论扩展到兄弟姐妹间的更广泛博弈，证明若个体在与兄弟姐妹的博弈中最大化“半康德”效用函数，则群体能抵抗显性突变基因入侵，但可能被隐性突变入侵，并找到了同时抵抗两者的条件。
This paper explores the evolutionary foundations of altruism among siblings and extends biologists' kin-selection theory to a richer class of games between relatives. It shows that a population will resist invasion by dominant mutant genes if individuals maximize a "semi-Kantian" utility function in games with their siblings. It is shown that a population that resists invasion by dominant mutants may be invaded by recessive mutants. Conditions are found under which a population resists invasion by dominant and also by recessive mutants.