Majority runoff elections: Strategic voting and Duverger's hypothesis
研究了大规模三候选人多数决两轮选举中的严格完美投票均衡，发现只有两种均衡类型，且挑战了真诚投票和推土机战术的常见观点，康多塞赢家可能无法进入第二轮。
The majority runoff system is widely used around the world, yet our understanding of its properties and of voters' behavior is limited. In this paper, we fully characterize the set of strictly perfect voting equilibria in large three-candidate majority runoff elections. Considering all possible distributions of preference orderings and intensities, we prove that only two types of equilibria can exist. First, there are always equilibria in which only two candidates receive votes. Second, there may exist an equilibrium in which three candidates receive votes. Its characteristics challenge common beliefs: (i) neither sincere voting by all voters nor pushover tactics (i.e. supporters of the front-runner voting for a less preferred candidate so as to influence who will face the front-runner in the second round) are supported in equilibrium, and (ii) the winner does not necessarily have democratic legitimacy since the Condorcet winner may not even participate in the second round.