Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment
研究了政府承诺能力不完美时最优失业保险的设计，发现完全信息揭示通常不是最优，社会福利与揭示概率呈凸关系，最优合同可通过失业和伤残福利联合系统实现。
We study optimal provision of unemployment insurance in a model where agents privately observe arrival of job opportunities and government’s ability to commit is imperfect. Imperfect commitment implies that full information revelation is generally suboptimal. Social welfare is convex in the probability with which agents reveal their private information. In the optimum, each agent is provided with incentives to either fully reveal his private information or not reveal it at all. The optimal contract can be decentralized by a joint system of unemployment and disability benefits in a way that resembles how these systems are used in practice.