On a policy of transferring public patients to private practice
研究了在公立医院容量受限时，卫生部门与私立医院签约转诊患者的意愿，发现医生双重执业导致“撇奶油”问题，降低了政策激励，且患者病情分散程度越大激励越低。
We consider an economy where public hospitals are capacity-constrained, and we analyse the willingness of health authorities to reach agreements with private hospitals to have some of their patients treated there. When physicians are dual suppliers, we show that a problem of cream-skimming arises and reduces the incentives of the health authority to undertake such a policy. We argue that the more dispersed are the severities of the patients, the greater the reduction in the incentives will be. We also show that, despite the patient selection problem, when the policy is implemented it is often the case that health authorities decide a more intensive transfer of patients to private practice.