ASYMMETRIC MARKET SHARES, ADVERTISING AND PRICING: EQUILIBRIUM WITH AN INFORMATION GATEKEEPER*
研究了市场份额不对称的企业如何通过信息守门人向购物者做广告和定价，发现小市场份额企业广告更激进但定价更不竞争，与以往文献结论不同。
We analyze how asymmetric market shares impact advertising and pricing decisions by firms that have loyal, non-shopping customers and can advertise to shoppers through a ‘gatekeeper.’ In equilibrium, the firm with the smaller loyal market advertises more aggressively but prices less competitively than the firm with the larger loyal market. Our results differ significantly from earlier literature which assumes that shoppers observe all prices and finds that the firm with the smaller loyal market adopts a more competitive pricing strategy. The predictions of the model are consistent with advertising and pricing behavior observed on price comparison websites such as http://Shopper.com.