质疑渔业“公地悲剧”模型的假设

Questioning the Assumptions of the "Tragedy of the Commons" Model of Fisheries

Land Economics · 1996
被引 178
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

检验了“公地悲剧”论点的六类假设(如个体动机、制度安排等),发现其描述和预测能力不足,需要更全面的框架来理解资源管理。

Abstract

The "tragedy of the commons" argument predicts the overexploitation of resources held in common. There is a great deal of evidence to the contrary. The descriptive accuracy and predictive validity of six categories of assumptions of the argument are examined. These include individual motivations, characteristics of individuals, nature of institutional arrangements, interactions among users, the ability of users to create new arrangements, and the behavior of regulatory authorities. The tragedy of the commons argument is seriously incomplete. It needs to be replaced by a richer and more accurate framework.

公地悲剧渔业资源制度安排用户自治