A Theory of Dual Labor Markets with Application to Industrial Policy, Discrimination, and Keynesian Unemployment
基于雇主激励工人的需要，构建了二元劳动力市场模型，解释了产业政策、职业隔离与歧视以及非自愿失业等现象。
This paper develops a model of dual labor markets based on employers' need to motivate workers. In order to elicit effort from their workers, employers may find it optimal to pay more than the going wage. This changes fundamentally the character of labor markets. The model is applied to a wide range of labor market phenomena. It provides a coherent framework for understanding the claims of industrial policy advocates. It also can provide the basis for a theory of occupational segregation and discrimination that will not be eroded by market forces. Finally, the model provides the basis for a theory of involuntary unemployment. Copyright 1986 by University of Chicago Press.