Multiunit Pay‐Your‐Bid Auction with One‐Dimensional Multiunit Demands*
研究两个同质竞拍者对多单位同质商品进行歧视性拍卖的对称贝叶斯均衡，并与多单位Vickrey拍卖及单单位拍卖比较，分析供应变化对均衡、平均收益和效率的影响。
An arbitrary number of units of a good is sold to two bidders through a discriminatory auction. The bidders are homogeneous ex ante and their demand functions are two‐step functions that depend on a single parameter. We characterize the symmetric Bayesian equilibrium and prove its existence and uniqueness. We compare this equilibrium with the equilibrium of the multiunit Vickrey auction and with the equilibria of the single‐unit first price and second price auctions. We examine the consequences of bundling all units into one package. We study the impacts that variations of the “relative” supply have on the equilibrium, on the bidders' average payoffs per unit, and on the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation.