The Effect of Wage Bargains on the Stock Market Value of the Firm
估计了集体谈判导致的劳动力成本意外变化如何影响普通股价值，发现两者之间存在一对一的权衡，支持了股东与工会财富总和最大化的强效率假说。
The author estimates the change in the value of common stock resulting from an unexpected change in collectively bargained labor costs. Using bargaining unit wage data and NYSE stock returns, he estimates a dollar for dollar trade-off between these variables. This result is consistent with stock valuations based on present value maximizing managerial decisions; that is, the results are consistent with Hotelling's lemma. The author also finds support for the hypothesis that collective bargains maximize the sum of shareholder and union member wealth; that is, the results are consistent with strong efficiency in the contracting environment. Copyright 1989 by American Economic Association.