Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers
提出金色降落伞和鲨鱼驱逐剂并非管理层自保工具，而是有利于股东，因为它们改善了经理与股东之间的契约关系，并用数据支持了这一观点。
A common view of golden parachutes and shark repellents is that they are designed by management to insulate itself from the discipline imposed by the market for corporate control and so are harmful to shareholders. This paper offers an alternative view that these devicesare beneficial to shareholders because they allow better contracting between manager and shareholders. Evidence on the incidence of goldenparachutes and on the compensation-tenure relationship for managers of golden parachute firms supports the alternative view. Copyright 1986 by American Economic Association.