Profit Sharing, Unions and Investment: An Extension
评论并扩展了Hoel和Moene（1988）关于利润分享对企业和员工影响的分析，转而研究企业单方面决定引入利润分享方案的条件，作为其保留管理权的净利润最大化策略。
This note comments on and extends the paper by Hoel and Moene (1988), hereafter HM, which analysed the effect of profit sharing (hereafter PS) on an individual firm and its employees. HM assumed that the existence and extent of PS is a matter for bargaining between firms and unions. However, evidence suggests that in practice it is almost always determined unilaterally by firms as a part of their right to manage. In this note I therefore analyze the circumstances in which firms will choose to introduce sharing schemes as part of a net profit maximizing strategy whereby they retain the right to manage. The framework is otherwise similar to HM's.