Law, Economics and Risk‐Taking
运用卡尔多-希克斯标准分析法律对风险溢出（外部性）的制裁如何影响经济效率，指出法律可能鼓励过度风险承担或过度减少风险承担，并认为严格产品责任的主要理由是收入分配而非效率提升。
SUMMARY The law shifts the risks borne by individuals in society and thereby influences the allocation of resources in society, the distribution of income and economic growth. Consequences for economic efficiency of the legal sanctioning of risk spillovers or externalities are analysed using the K aldor ‐H icks criterion. Examples are given in which the law encourages excessive risk‐taking from a social point of view along with a few cases in which it leads to an excessive reduction in risk‐taking. It is observed that the legal practice of compensating for actual damages sustained, rather than for the risk or possibility of damage, is least costly to parties creating the risk. Product liability is discussed. It is argued that the distribution of income rather than gains in economic efficiency provides the main rationale for strict product liability.