Agency Theory, Institutional Sensitivity, and Inductive Reasoning: Towards a Legal Perspective
批判代理理论，认为仅增加制度敏感性不够，需重新审视其基础。通过归纳研究和法律理论，重新定义委托人角色和董事会地位，将利益相关者视为团队成员，以增强制度敏感性。
abstract Making agency theory institutionally sensitive is a reasonable suggestion, as far as normal science stands. However, we argue that such a move has already been taking place, that it cannot address important problems with agency theory, and that the time is ripe for a critical re‐examination of this theory. We suggest that inductive studies can not only be more sensitive to institutional features than deductive studies, but they can also offer deeper understanding of governance practices in specific contexts, as well as the potential for analytical or moderatum generalizations. Drawing from legal theory, we offer an alternative conception of the principal, and of the role and status of the board of directors. We contend that this reformulated agency theory has a greater potential of being institutionally sensitive because it recognizes various stakeholders as team members, rather than just adding specific institutional features as variables to the dominant conception of agency theory.