Employment Protection and Unemployment Benefits: On Technology Adoption and Job Creation in a Matching Model
研究了就业保护、失业救济和工资税如何影响企业技术选择和就业创造，发现“灵活保障”（低就业保护加高失业救济）在工人风险厌恶强且敲竹杠问题严重时最优。
Abstract We analyse the effects of different labour‐market policies (employment protection, unemployment benefits, and payroll taxes) on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex post bargaining. The model is characterized by two intertwined sources of inefficiency, namely a matching externality and a hold‐up externality associated with the bargaining strength of workers. The results depend on the relative importance of the two externalities and on worker risk aversion. “Flexicurity”, meaning low employment protection and generous unemployment insurance, can be optimal if workers are sufficiently risk‐averse and the hold‐up problem is relatively important.