Tax Incidence, Partial Policy Improvements and Centralized Wage-Setting
研究了政府使用税收政策工具并平衡预算时，工资设定工会如何影响税收归宿，以及一个行业的补贴如何间接成为其他行业的税收。
Subsidies are often recommended both in theoretical analysis and in practical applications as a remedy for involuntary unemployment; cf. Oswald (1984). Likewise, subsidies which assist domestic firms in their competition with foreign rivals are viewed with increasing favor. In order to raise the number of well-paid jobs, high wage or high value added industries should be subsidized or protected from foreign competition; see Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1983). These considerations are of a partial equilibrium nature, however; there is no theory as to how wages are determined and only one industry is examined in an otherwise competitive economy. This paper focuses on the case where the government uses some taxes as policy instruments but balances its budget by other revenueraising taxes, and where a wage-setting union takes this government behavior as given.' The tax incidence on workers then has an impact on wages, and expansion in one industry raises wages in general and reduces employment in the others, so that the subsidy in one industry implicitly becomes the tax in another. The study proceeds as follows. In Section II we specify the determination of employment and wages in an open economy with one economy-wide union. In Section III, we assume that the government can discriminate between the industries and in Section IV, that the authorities are subject to uniform tax and subsidy rates. In both of these cases, specific policy rules are obtained.