Domino Dumping, I: Competitive Exporters
当出口企业面临自愿出口限制的可能性时，它们会提前增加出口以获取更多配额，导致政府可能采取出口税或补贴，从而引发贸易扭曲的多米诺效应，且反倾销执法通常无法消除甚至可能加剧倾销。
When exporting firms face the prospect of voluntary export restraints, they have an incentive to export more than with no prospect of a voluntary export restraint, since greater exports lead to larger license allocations in the event of a voluntary export restraint. Export-country governments' incentives differ, leading either to export tax or subsidy, depending on the circumstances. The prospect of one departure from free trade, thus, leads to another, a domino effect. Antidumping enforcement will ordinarily not eliminate and ironically may increase dumping. Copyright 1992 by American Economic Association.