维持统一的(电子)货币

Maintaining a Uniform (Electronic) Currency

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · 1999
被引 12
人大 A-ABS 4

中文导读

探讨是否应允许银行发行私人电子货币,分析其对铸币税、货币政策有效性和货币体系稳定性的影响,并强调统一货币可能丧失的担忧。

Abstract

THE ROLE A CENTRAL BANK SHOULD PLAY in operating or regulating a payments system is not a new issue. Back in 1913, for example, Congress decided that the Federal Reserve would play a major role, providing the country with a national check-clearing system and a single, uniform currency. And while that role has not changed much over the years, in 1980 Congress revised its view of the payments system with the passage of the Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act. Among other things, the Act requires the Federal Reserve to price its check-clearing services and earn a competitive return, or exit the business. Today, the role of the Federal Reserve in providing a national currency is being reexamined. This reexamination is driven by recent technological advances. Banks now have the ability to offer a new kind of currency, electronic cash (also known as ecash), that could readily compete with Federal Reserve notes. So the question naturally arises: Should Congress allow banks to issue their own private currency, a privilege banks used to have before the Civil War? To answer that question, we need to address several concerns, including one that is often overlooked the loss of a uniform currency. Allowing banks to issue currency (e-cash) usually raises concerns about the loss of seigniorage, the effectiveness of monetary policy, and the overall stability of our monetary system. Allowing banks to issue their own currency will no doubt reduce seigniorage. Because e-cash will be a close substitute for Federal Reserve notes, the success of e-cash will be at the expense of the United States Treasury. Related to the concern over the loss of seigniorage is the concern that as the demand for Federal Reserve notes declines so will the impact of monetary policy. Furthermore, the introduction of e-cash may not only weaken monetary policy, but it may also make markets less stable. Based on the history of private money systems, some economists worry that banks would be tempted to overissue their currency. While these are legitimate concerns, a concern that is often overlooked when the e-

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