农业保护的政治市场

Political Market for Agricultural Protection

American Journal of Agricultural Economics · 1992
被引 1
人大 AABS 3

中文导读

用新古典政治市场理论解释为何穷国对农业征税而富国补贴农业,通过分析工业化进程中政治市场供需曲线的变化来寻找答案。

Abstract

Why do poor countries tax agriculture more than other sectors, whereas rich countries subsidize farmers? Using the neoclassical economic theory of the political market for Distortionary policies, an explanation is sought by examining changes to factors affecting the supply and demand curves in that political market. The aggregate effect of these changes is a shift in both the demand curves and the supply curve to the right as industrialization proceeds.

农业保护政治市场扭曲性政策工业化进程农业税收与补贴