A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections
分析了选民策略性投票时决选选举制度的特性，发现决选选举会产生只有两位候选人得票的均衡，真诚投票均衡不一定存在，且门槛低于50%的决选制度可能导致孔多塞失败者系统性地获胜。
This paper analyzes the properties of runoff electoral systems when voters are strategic. A model of three-candidate runoff elections is presented, and two new features are included: the risk of upset victory in the second round is endogenous, and many types of runoff systems are considered. Three main results emerge. First, runoff elections produce equilibria in which only two candidates receive a positive fraction of the votes. Second, a sincere voting equilibrium does not always exist. Finally, runoff systems with a threshold below 50 percent produce an Ortega effect that may lead to the systematic victory of the Condorcet loser.